The Bitter US Friendship and a Tough Neighbourhood
One Minute Brief
The objective of this book review in about 2700 words (or 6 pages) is to provide a ‘Summary’ and reproduce Important ‘Excerpts’ to capture the sense of different chapters for those people who do not have the time or patience to read the full book (13 Chapters, 347 pages). A further quick read of the book is through 500 words Summary which is given below.
This book-length analysis by Shuja Nawaz first published in 2020 is about all important and complex dimensions of relationship between United States and Pakistan which has remained topsy-turvy in the past for so many decades. In this marriage of convenience with unequal partners, the author identifies the way forward for US and Pakistani leaders to make the right choices for a mutually beneficial long term interests. In short, USA needs to develop a long term Pakistan specific strategic policy while Pakistan for its development needs to rely on its own; attracting domestic investments, using its human capital and natural resources.
Table of Contents
Important Excerpts from the Book
– Chapter 2/ Friends or Freenemies (27 pages)
– Chapter 3/ 2011: A Most Horrible Year (16 pages)
– Chapter 4/ From Tora Bora to Pathan Gali (36 pages)
– Chapter 6/ Salala: Anatomy of Failed Alliance (24 pages)
– Chapter 8/ US Aid: Leverage or a Trap (39 pages)
– Chapter 9/ Mil-to-Mil Relations: Do More (29 pages)
– Chapter 10/ Standing in the Right Corner (23 pages)
– Chapter 11/ Transforming the Pakistan Army (26 pages)
– Chapter 12/ Pakistan’s Military Dilemma (14 pages)
– Chapter 13/ Choices (22 pages)
About the Author
Shuja Nawaz is a globally recognized political and strategic analyst. He has been associated with South Asia at the bi-partisan think tank, the Atlantic Council in Washington, DC. He is author of many books on Pakistan relating to Army, Security, USA-PAK relationship, Terrorism, Militancy and Counter Insurgency. Shuja Nawaz’s unique access to power corridors in Pakistan & USA enables him to provide deep & fascinating insights to understand the complexities of relationships which can serve as an invaluable guide for politicians, diplomats and students of Political Science and International Affairs.
Summary of the Book
Shuja Nawaz has succinctly captured the major events in Pakistan year wise in a 16 page section entitled “Important Milestones 2007-19” in the book which provides a quick historical background to review the detailed examination of the relationship between Pakistan and the United States for the stated period. As the Author indicates, this book is a continuation of his much acclaimed previous book, ‘Cross Swords’.
This book principally covers the recent history of the relationship, however, it is important to keep in mind the difficulties faced in the early years by Pakistan after its independence in 1947. While India joined non- aligned movement, Pakistan chose US led Camp in early 1950s as a protection from a bigger and better armed India. USA entered into this relationship to impede the influence of Communism from Russia, China and North Korea. USA had never any intention to come to Pakistan’s Rescue if India attacked Pakistan as was evident from events of Sino-India War 1962 (USA supplied arms to India) and Indo-Pakistan War 1965 wherein Washington stopped all arms to both Pakistan & India wherePakistan suffered the most having higher dependence on American weapons.
With quite an opposing objectives & expectations in the background, the stormy relationship in early years resulted in “Trust Deficit” in both countries. These disappointments also led Pakistan to gradually drift into China’s ambit converting itself into comprehensive strategic & military relationships. As to the recent history, killing of two persons in Lahore by Raymond Davis, a US Government Contractor, in January 2011 ; the killing of Osama Bin Laden in May 2011 by US Forces in a hideout near Abbottabad without informing & taking on board Pakistani Government & Military; Memogate leaks in October 2011, Salala attack on Pakistani Troops in November 2011, actions against good & bad Taliban in Afghanistan after 9/11/2001, Drone Strikes etc. were some major issues which brought the relationship between two countries to its lowest ebb.
The Battle for Pakistan is a book worth reading which gives insight into the realities and dynamics which have shaped present day Pakistan and the US-Pakistan engagements. It should be read by students of the Region, US/Pakistan Policy Makers, Joint Force Planners and Military Practitioners.
The book In conclusion proposes that USA needs to develop a long term Pakistan specific policy which should not be a subset of Washington’s India or Afghanistan strategies. For solid & sustainable affiliation, the hearts and minds of people of Pakistan could be won if US eschews transactional relationships with Pakistan for its military objectives giving higher priority to investments in social sector projects such as health, education, infrastructure development.
The Author also observes that Pakistan itself is key to its change and development. It has the people, the idea, the strategic location and untapped resources to make it a peaceful hub for economic activity in South & Central Asia and other Nations including USA & China would come to its help to reach its goals.
Important Excerpts from the Book
Chapter 1/ The Revenge of Democracy (48 pages)
Chapter 2/ Friends or Freenemies (27 pages)
Page 62: Was it wise for Obama to announce the timeline for beginning of withdrawal of US Forces from Afghanistan when he did in his West Point speech in December 2009. Riedel does not think so.
Page 63: He (Bruce Riedel – a retired CIA Analyst, Brookings Institution Scholar and South Asia Policy Advisor during Obama’s presidential campaign) believes that ‘the Obama administration inherited the policy on Al-Qaeda and Afghanistan that was not working, in fact, heading towards losing. They inherited from Bush, no policy on Pakistan.
Page 67: (Riedel believed that) If you pursued it from an Af-Pak policy, you were always seeing Pakistan solely from Kabul dimension, which undermines the self-importance of Islamabad.
Page 67: From an Interview of Riedel;
It’s a country (Pakistan) of close to 200 million people now. It will have 300 million people in our lifetime. It has a proven nuclear weapons programme. It has huge military, bigger than it needs probably. It has powerful soft power as a Muslim country. It is a country which… actually has had real elections in which power has transitioned from one elected government to another… Compare that to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, you name it, and you would recognize that if we were thinking about the ten most important countries in the world for the United State in the next decade ahead, Pakistan would clearly belong. But unfortunately, because it is in South Asia, it falls into a chasm between India and Iran in which it seems to be lost and passed over.
Chapter 3/ 2011: A Most Horrible Year (16 pages)
Page 87: The Davis affair became an instant diplomatic row between the US and Pakistan. The US position was that Davis was a diplomat. Pakistan did not agree.
Page 88: The US took a big gamble by getting the President to declare Davis a diplomat. But the Geneva Conventions do not support the Obama statement.
Chapter 4/ From Tora Bora to Pathan Gali (36 pages)
Page 92: A major blow to US-Pakistan relationship occurred when a heliborne force of SEALS Team Six of the US Navy invaded Pakistan on 2 May 2011 from their base in Afghanistan, killed Osama bin Laden in his secret lair in the Bilal Town neighbourhood of Abbottabad.
Page 114: The American Narrative was that Pakistan was unaware of the raid because Pakistanis could not be trusted. In Pakistan, the Land of Conspiracies, this was seen as a smokescreen to help protect Pakistani collaboration.
Chapter 5/ Internal Battles (20 pages)
Chapter 6/ Salala: Anatomy of Failed Alliance (24 pages)
Page 148: An exchange of fire on the night of 25-26 November 2011, in the Pakistan-Afghanistan borderlands, between Pakistani & US Forces, led to an unrelenting US aerial attack for nearly two hours on two isolated Pakistani posts named Volcano and Boulder at a place named Salala.
Page 149: By the time the firing ceased that night, twenty-four Pakistanis had been killed by American forces and another thirteen wounded. The dead included two officers and twenty-two soldiers. Significantly, there were no US or Afghan casualties.
Page 150: Parliament took umbrage at what it considered to be American high-handedness in dealing with Pakistan, and got into reviewing and debating the situation.
Unresolved in terms of assignment of fault or punishment, one more painful episode was thus added to Pakistani memory banks about the overbearing attitude of the American ‘friends’.
Page 165: In many ways, Salala marked the beginning of the end of the Pakistani alliance with the US that had been revived after 9/11.
Chapter 7/ Mismanaging the Civil-Military Relationship (26 pages)
Chapter 8/ US Aid: Leverage or a Trap (39 pages)
Page 205: Funding for the Mangla and later Tarbela dams, and the US support for the World Bank to assist India and Pakistan in agreeing on the Indian Basin Treaty did more to avert war and secure the peace in the region than any direct aid from the US.
Page 207: The invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, following the 9/11 attacks on the US by Al-Qaeda, was a military plan. Economics was given a back seat till quite late in the game. As a result, security and aid became intertwined, with aid becoming a junior partner in the process.
Page 209: There was little strategic vision behind the US Policy in the region. It lurched from year to year, from commander to commander. The military called the shots.
Page 236: Pakistan continued to operate as an aid-dependent country, living from handout to handout rather than reshaping its economic and political landscape to take into account it’s natural and human resources as well as its strategic location for economic advantage. The US lacked a strategy for Pakistan that would build its tie with this key South Asian nation on the one hand and help its global aim to contain China’s growing influence.
Chapter 9/ Mil-to-Mil Relations: Do More (29 pages)
Page 238: The US on its part talked about a strategic approach to Pakistan and the region, but it too continued to behave tactically, shifting its policies and operations frequently and behaving in a transactional manner.
Page 239: Afghanistan: One War, 17 Years, 18 Commanders
Page 240: Each Allied Commander had his own rules of engagement. And he brought his own team and set of experiences to the war zone, confusing allies and giving solace to the enemy that took advantage of the fresh learning curve each time the command changed hands. Each had his 100-Day Plan.
Page 251: The Tierny Report also recognized that the CSF (Coalition Support Fund) further strengthened the view among ordinary Pakistanis that the US favoured relations with the military over the civilians in Pakistan and also criticized the US for the wrong emphasis.
Page 252: In retrospect, it appears the agreement may have been based on faulty Pakistani assumptions: first, that the conflict would be of short duration; and second, that a marginal cost pricing applied to the expenditures related to moving Pakistani forces into the border region would more than cover the costs to Pakistan, leaving a profit of some kind. In fact, the conflict became prolonged, and the real costs of the movement and placement of troops to the army and general economy, through damage to the equipment, infrastructure and morale, was much higher than calculated.
Chapter 10/ Standing in the Right Corner (23 pages)
Page 266: The Core of the US-Pakistan relationship over 2008-16 continued to be the direct link between the two militaries.
Page 273: Pakistan was being made a scapegoat for the ‘inadequacies’ of the Coalition and overall situation in Afghanistan.
Page 282: That togetherness did not materialize, as the earth-shaking events of 2011 inside Pakistan took the erstwhile and aspiring ‘allies’ into a deep well of hurt and disappointment for both.
Chapter 11/ Transforming the Pakistan Army (26 pages)
Page 290: Neither is there a linear relationship between the use of force and achievement of political outcomes, a lesson that both the Soviet Union and the US learned over time…………..
Rather than seeking a radical transformation, it has added layers of modernity over crusted layers of outmoded structures and thinking.
Page 309: Pakistan missed an opportunity to reassess its higher defence organizational structure that had been originally envisaged in the unfinished plan presented during the elder Bhutto’s tenure, when the JCS (Joint Chiefs of Staff) Committee was first set up under a four-star. Lack of follow up on that plan effectively left the JCS set-up without real power, and the centre of gravity remained with the army chief……………………..Ideally, the creation of a more powerful JCS or Chief of Defence Staff position would allow better coordination of all services during peace and war.
Page 314: The military needs public support to be effective. It also needs public scrutiny to become more efficient, especially as it fights the Long War against militancy and terrorism at home and faces expanding threats on its international borders.
Chapter 12/ Pakistan’s Military Dilemma (14 pages)
Page 317: Though the Constitution of Pakistan established civilian supremacy over the military, the armed forces and in particular the army, continue to dominate decision making in Pakistan.
Page 318: Yet the dominating issue facing Pakistan’s defence strategy is its continuing ‘ no peace, no war’ relationship with its dominant neighbor to the east, India.
Page 321: Over time, India’s larger economy will allow it to use a smaller proportion of its GDP for its defence. Pakistan’s smaller economic pie will not afford it that luxury, unless it begins growing close to 7 percent or more a year and cuts unproductive expenditures, including within the military.
Page 328: The answer rests on a Strategic Restraint Regime, rooted in continuing and deepening contacts between India and Pakistan at all levels of government and society to reduce the risk of accidental conflict. And by increased focus within Pakistan on rebalancing its economic and political systems to make them inclusive and equitable.
Chapter 13/ Choices (22 pages)
Page 329: Pakistan can play an important security and development role in the region and as a partner of the US, even as it maintains its separate relationships with its immediate neighbours, China, Afghanistan, India and Iran.
Page 330: The US cannot afford to create or encourage divisions in South Asia. Over the next ten to fifteen years, South Asia could be poised to play a pivotal role on the global economic and political scene. Given its size, India is in a position to take the regional lead, and Pakistan could end up playing either a major supporting role or the role of a critical spoiler, if its polity deteriorates instead of stabilizing and improving.
Page 342: Domestic Investmentwill be key to moving its economy to a higher plane.
Page 344: Pakistan needs to free itself of economic dependence on US aid by undertaking reforms internally and reducing tensions with India and Afghanistan.
Page 345: A leaner, more mobile and more effective military may offer a more powerful defence of the country against internal and external threats.
Page 348: The US needs to craft a clearer and longer-term Pakistan strategy and not see it as a spin-off or subset of its Afghanistan or India strategies.
Page 349: History has taught us that crisis will continue to erupt in the Arc of Instability that extends from Turkey to Indonesia. Who knows when the US may need to have Pakistan on its side again.
About the Book
Title : The Battle for Pakistan
Author : Shuja Nawaz
Publisher : Liberty Publishing
Publishing Year : 2020
ISBN : 978-969-872-909-7
Edition : First
Qaiser Naqvi mistakenly placed this comment in ‘Old is Gold’ whereas it was meant to belong to ‘The Battle for Pakistan’. Placing it here :
“Zawar you have added a very pertinent addition to the book by Shuja Nawaz.Shuja being brother of Pak Army C in C late Asif Nawaz had an opportunity to observe many happenings from a close range. Your comments lead to a better understanding of Pakistan’s politics”.
I need to read it again slowly. Interesting read, in a bit of rush.